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4 
''Custodial Interrogation'' 
~lthln The Meaning 
of Miranda 
By Yale Kamisar* 
Police Station Interrogation vs. "Field Interrogation" 
Probably the most difficult and frequently raised question 
in the wake of Miranda is what constitutes the "in-custody inter-
rogation" or "custodial questioning" which must be preceded by 
the Miranda warnings. Since the pre-Miranda controversy had 
centered over what rights the suspect enjoyed after he was 
brought to the police station, see e.g.) Breitel, Criminal Law and 
Criminal justice) 1966 UTAH L. REv. l, 8-9; since the Court had 
much experience with police station interrogation but had never 
decided a case considering the application of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to "on the street" or "on the spot" questioning; 
and since the four cases it decided in Miranda all involved 
"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere" (384 U.S. at 445), it is hardly surprising 
that the opinion is not very illuminating as to what is meant 
by "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of 
his freedom of action in any significant way" (id. at 444, 
emphasis added) or "police interrogation while in custody at the 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
335 
336 / "C U 5 T 0 D I A L I N T E R R 0 G A T I 0 N" 
station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action m any 
significant way" (id. at 477, emphasis added). 
In many respects these general definitions are not much more 
helpful than the terms they define-except that they seem to 
make fairly plain that the scope of Miranda is not limited to 
police station interrogation nor even · to instances where the 
suspect is technically or formally under "arrest." It seems that 
again and again the Court studiously avoided use of the term 
"arrest" in favor of less technical and more general terms such 
as "custody" and "significant deprivation of freedom." By includ-
ing some "field" and "squad car" questioning within its coverage, 
the Court understandably (albeit gingerly and uncertainly) sought 
to protect its flanks. If "custodial interrogation" were limited to 
questioning in a police station or to questioning that occurs 
after a formal arrest, "the police would need only to delay 
formal arrest or physical transfer of an accused to the station 
house in order to circumvent the constitutional safeguards 
Miranda dictates." Commonwealth v. Stites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A. 
2d 387, 390 (1967). See generally SoBEL, THE NEw CoNFESSION 
STANDARDS 56-58 (1966). 
The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court 
was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation 
is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because 
such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process 
for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no 
legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no 
legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply. 
See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A 
Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the 
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 
MICH. L. REv. 59, 65, 69, 77-83 (1966). In the course of toppling 
this "legal reasoning" the Court dwelt on the cases before it and 
many extracts from police interrogation manuals as the most 
obvious and graphic examples of the unreality, inadequacy and 
casuistry of the old reasoning. "The current practice of in-
communicado interrogation" was so "at odd.s with" the principle 
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that "the individual may not be compelled to incriminate him-
self," pp. 457-58; the coercive pressures generated when a de-
fendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run 
through menacing police interrogation· procedures," p. 457; 
were so substantial, that the only tenable view, according to the 
Miranda majority, was that the privilege had to "apply to in-
formal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during 
in-custody questioning," p. 46I, had to be "available outside of 
criminal court proceedings," p. 467. But to limit the impact of 
Miranda to the most poignant examples of the need for the 
applicability of the privilege to non-judicial, informal confronta-
tions-as some state cases seem to suggest, see, e.g.) State v. 
Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, I58 S.E.2d 638, 644 (I968); Common-
wealth v. Ep~rjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A. 2d 2I6, 223 (I966); Gaudio 
v. State, I Md. App. 455, 230 A. 2d 700, 707-08 (Ct. Spec. App., 
Md., I967); cf. People v. P. (Anonymous), 2I N.Y. 2d I, 233 N. E. 
2d 255, 257-58, 26I ( I967)-mistakes, it is submitted, the "ad-
vocacy" in the Miranda opinion, if you want to call it that, for 
its scope. 
Although the Miranda opinion itself may not be read to cover 
only police station interrogation, it is possible, of course, that 
in the years ahead a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court will so 
cut down Miranda. In Mathis v. United States, 88 Sup. Ct. I503 
( I968), the three Miranda dissenters still on the Court made it 
plain that this is one way they would like to narrow the scope 
of that landmark decision. In Mathis, an Internal Revenue 
agent failed to give petitioner the Miranda warnings when 
questioning him about his prior income tax returns while peti-
tioner was incarcerated in a state jail serving a state sentence. 
A 5-3 majority, per Justice Black (Marshall, J., not participating), 
rejected the government's arguments that Miranda was inapplic-
able because (I) the questioning was part of a "routine tax 
investigation" and (2) petitioner had not been jailed by the 
interrogating federal officers but was there for an entirely 
different offense, as "differences ... too minor and shadowy 
to justify a departure from the well-considered conclusion of 
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Miranda with reference to warnings to be given to a person held 
in custody."1 However, dissenting Justice White, joined by Harlan 
and Stewart, J J ., maintained that 
Miranda rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction 
but on a conclusion that coercion-pressure to answer ques-
tions-usually flows from a certain type of custody, police 
station interrogation of someone charged with or suspected 
of a crime. Although petitioner was confined, he was at the 
time of interrogation in familiar surroundings. . . . The 
rationale of Miranda has no relevance to inquiries conducted 
outside the allegedly hostile and forbidding atmosphere 
surrounding police station interrogation of a criminal suspect. 
(88 Sup. Ct. at 1506) (Emphasis added.) 
"Custody" vs. "Focus" 
It is plain that Miranda applies to situations not covered by 
Escobedo, i.e., to custodial questioning of one not yet the 
"prime suspect," "central figure," "target" or "focal point" of 
an investigation. See, e.g., Mathis supra, McFall, supra, Common-
wealth v. Banks, -- Pa. --, 239 A. 2d 416 (1968) (rejecting 
1. See also the pre-Mathis case of People v. McFall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. 
App. lst Dist., Div. 2, 1968) where the court rejected the prosecution's 
claim that Miranda was inapplicable because when questioned about 
ownership of the car he was driving defendant was not in custody on 
any charge relating to the vehicle but was arrested on fraudulent checks 
and forgery charges. Pointed out the court, at 279: 
Granting that the charges upon which defendant was arrested are 
totally unrelated to the subsequent charge of auto theft and that 
the questioning as to the car ownership was only investigatory, the 
rationale and explicit language of the Miranda decision rule out any 
such limitation on present admissibility requirements . . . [C]onsider-
ing the evil against which Miranda is directed, it is the fact of cus-
todial interrogation rather than its cause or the accusatory nature of 
the questions asked which necessitates the application of Miranda. 
In light of Mathis, People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. S47 (Ct. App. 4th 
Dist. Div. 2, 1968), which held that a person under "technical arrest" for 
certain offenses (tampering with gas pumps and a traffic violation) could 
be questioned about a different offense (auto theft), would seem to have 
been wrongly decided. 
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argument that defendant need not have been warned because 
he was merely being questioned as "a witness"). But are the 
Miranda warnings required when the converse is true? When 
the suspect is not in custody or significantly deprived of his 
freedom, but he is a "prime suspect" or the "focal point" of an 
investigation? Does Escobedo supplement Miranda or has it been 
displaced by it? 
After defining "custodial interrogation" as ~·questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way," the Court, as Professor Kenneth Graham aptly put 
it, Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's An-
ticpatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
59, 114 (1966), "drops an obfuscating footnote": "This is what 
we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which 
had focused on an accused." (p. 444 n. 4) 
Although, as Professor Graham suggests, in his painstaking 
analysis of this point, footnote 4 may indicate that "custody" 
and "focus" are to be alternative grounds for requiring the 
warnings, that "the Court may wish to push the rule to cover 
situations where there is no custody, in the usual sense of the 
term, to restrict, for example, deliberate use of i.nformers to 
elicit evidence, as in Massiah" [377 U.S. 201, 12 L.Ed. 2d 246, 84 
S.Ct. 1199 (1964)], or to prohibit any questioning "of persons who 
... could have been arrested" or "are ready to be prosecuted," 
~d. at 115-17, this writer is of the view that, as Professor Graham 
also suggests, id. at 114-15, Miranda's use of "custodial interroga-
tion" actually marks a fresh start in describing the point at which 
the Constitutional protections begin. Under this latter view, 
footnote 4 only amounts to an understandable, but misleading, 
attempt to maintain some continuity with a recent precedent 
which, although (perhaps because) it marked an important new 
chapter in the law of confessions, was a more groping and 
looser opinion than Miranda. But see Windsor v. United States, 
389 F. 2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1968) (viewing the "focus" test as 
alternative ground for requiring Miranda warnings); Common-
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wealth v. jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A. 2d 765, 768 (1967) (same); 
People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 461, 466 (1966) 
(same); People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S. 2d 249, 251, 
rev'd mem., 281 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (1967) (same); Hoffman, J., dis-
senting in Commonwealth v. Barclay, 240 A. 2d 838 (Super. Ct. 
Pa. 1968) (same); People v. Ceccone, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 
2d Dist., Div. 3, 1968) (once investigation becomes "focused upon" 
suspect, interrogation becomes "custodial"); cf. Allen v. United 
States, 390 F. 2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (whether investigation had 
"focused on" suspect a major factor in determining whether he 
was being subjected to "custodial interrogation").2 
Since this very issue was disputed by participants at the con-
ference on Escobedo and Miranda held by the Institute of 
Continuing Legal Education during the summer of 1966, it may 
be profitable to quote at length from the pertinent panel 
evaluation at this 1966 conference, A New Look at Confessions: 
Escobedo-The Second Round 91-94, 98-102 (George ed. 1967): 
"[Dean John W.] REED: ... I observed that Professor 
Kamisar said, and I read some of Judge Edwards' remarks 
to suggest the same point, that to a large extent Miranda 
displaces Escobedo. This reminded me of the case of an 
informal visit to a person's home by a policeman who 
says, 'You are not under any compulsion to admit me or 
answer questions.' Since suspicion has focused on that person, 
and let's assume it has, he is really being questioned because 
he is a suspect, and is being interrogated without counsel. 
Escobedo conceivably would apply to outlaw this practice, 
or would have applied but for Miranda) but Miranda would 
not preclude the questioning. I think both these gentlemen 
are saying in this situation that if there is truly no com-
pulsion on the defendant to speak, and thus no basis to 
apply Miranda, one may still apply Escobedo. 
"Am I foolish in suggesting at this point that Escobedo 
might still apply, and that the heavy burden on the police 
2. These cases are discussed at length infra, pp. 362-371, 374-378. 
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in the individual case should be to comply with both rules? 
Why is Escobedo inapplicable to this kind of case? 
"KAMISAR: I think the Supreme Court has made it 
fairly plain that if a man is not in custody, is not really 
restrained, no warning has to be given. The function of 
the Miranda warnings is to dispel the coercion inherent 
in police custodial surroundings and the interrogation 
process, to relieve the suspect of anxieties generated when he 
is torn from a familiar environment and thrust into a 
police-dominated atmosphere, or to relieve him of the 
typically lesser but still substantial anxieties created when 
he is restrained 'on the street' by uniformed officers and 
questioned there or in the squad car. If a suspect is not 
being significantly restrained, not being subjected to 'cus-
todial interrogation,' there is no inherent coercion to 
neutralize, no inherent anxiety to counteract. 
"A clear case would be one where an individual is inter-
viewed in the presence of a friend or relative. This situation 
does not require issuance of the Miranda warnings-even 
though the police have 'focused' on him, even though he is 
the 'prime suspect.' I think it is quite legitimate to read 
Miranda as encouraging the police to engage more exten-
sively in pre-arrest, pre-custody, pre-restraint questioning. 
Apparently the F.B.I. has done this over the years with 
considerable success. So it seems have the District of Columbia 
police as they have felt the brunt of the McNabb-Mallory 
rule. Ought we not encourage the police to do this? Does 
this not avoid the stigma of an arrest for a felony as well as 
the greater coercion generated by an arrest and a forced trip 
to the police station? 
"I realize we quickly run into some very difficult problems, 
such as exactly when an 'arrest' takes place, and when it is 
that an individual feels free to move on and when he does 
not. In many ambiguous situations, it seems to me, the 
officer must make it clear to the individual that he is 'free' 
if he wants to establish later that the man was not 'arrested.' 
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"As I read Miranda, it is not simply a bigger and better 
(or worse, depending upon your viewpoint) Escobedo. It is 
quite different. Escobedo assigns primary significance to the 
amount of evidence of guilt available to the police at the 
time of questioning; hence there is much talk about 'prime 
suspects,' 'focal point,' and the 'accusatory' stage. Miranda, on 
the other hand, attaches pi'imary significance to the condi-
tions surrounding or inherent in the interrogation setting; 
hence it includes much talk of 'police-dominated' or 'govern-
ment-established atmosphere' that 'carries its own badge of 
intimidation,' 'compulsion inherent in custodial surround-
ings,' 'subjugating the individual to the will of his examiner,' 
'putting the defendant in such an emotional state as to 
impair his capacity for rational judgment,' and the like. If 
the requisite inherent pressures, intimidation and anxieties 
exist, Miranda applies whether in the eyes of the police the 
subject is a prime suspect or no suspect at all, whether he 
is plainly the 'accused' or only a 'potential witness.' On the 
other hand, absent these conditions the person subjected 
to police questioning is not entitled to the Miranda warnings 
-no matter how much the police have 'focused' on him or 
to what extent they regard him as the 'prime' suspect, the 
only suspect or 'the accused.' Miranda has broadened and 
deepened Escobedo in some respects, but narrowed it in 
others. Miranda has not enlarged Escobedo as much as 
it has displaced it .... 
"REED: Doesn't the mere fact of questioning by a uni-
formed officer rather than a plainclothes detective have a 
significant deterrent influence on the conduct of the in-
dividual? He says, 'Well you are free to go,' but the 
individual knows or feels that if he starts to go, he may 
indeed then be arrested. Isn't this the same thing as detention? 
"KAMISAR: Of course any questioning anywhere by a 
police officer generates some pressures and anxieties, but this 
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is also true of 'general on-the-scene questioning' and of visits 
by police at one's home or place of business, even in the 
presence of a relative or friend. In the latter situations, 
however, the Court tells us that the requisite warnings need 
not be given (or, at least, need not always be given) because 
'the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-
custody_ interrogation is not necessarily present' [see 384 
U.S. at 478]. 
"Suppose the officer says: 'Little Miss So-and-So is missing 
and we are going around the neighborhood checking this 
out. Can you help us?' It is not at all clear to me that the 
man who comes to the door of his house will be arrested 
or feels that he will be arrested if he says: 'I'm busy,' or 
'No, I won't cooperate; that's your problem, not mine.' 
But how often does this really come up? I think very, very 
few people slam doors in officers' faces when they ask for 
cooperation. I know I don't, and presumably I am equipped 
to be tougher than most in such situations. The overwhelming 
majority of citizens will talk, will cooperate. This is evidenced 
by the experience of the F.B.I. and the District of Columbia 
police. 
"[Judge Robert C.] FINLEY: I do not find myself too 
much in agreement with Professor Kamisar except on the 
inapplicability of the Miranda requirements to an interview 
at the home, which is a rather casual sort of inquiry. But 
I think that even that is not absolute. If the police are 
pretty well informed that this man is a hot suspect or that 
he is likely to give some very definite leads or information, 
we run into the problem of the 'poisonous tree' doctrine .... 
"Law enforcement people must take a position that where 
there is reason to think they are really hot on the trail 
of the fellow who committed a crime or who knows some-
thing about it, they must give a reasonable warning at that 
time. Certainly to stop a man in the street is not to take 
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him into custody as such, but it is a restraint of the man's 
freedom when he is stopped. He is under some compulsion 
at that time. . . . 
"KAMISAR: I think we are running into some confusion. 
I thought I made it clear that when a man is stopped on 
the street by the police, when a man is restrained by the 
police, the warnings may be required. On the other hand, 
even though the police have focused on a man, even if the 
man has become the 'prime suspect,' the warnings are not 
required if the authorities have not deprived the suspect of 
his freedom of action. At least, this is how I read Miranda. 
This is what I mean when I say that Miranda, in a sense, 
has displaced, not simply clarified and expanded Escobedo. 
"For example, suppose a woman is murdered and every-
body in town is convinced that her husband did it. The 
police are convinced that the husband is the only one who 
could have done it. The husband is the hottest suspect 
imaginable. The police pay a call on him. He is sitting in 
the living room talking to his brother. The police say to 
him: 'We're not arresting you. You are free to tell us to 
leave. Your brother can stay here and listen if he wants to 
do so. But if you are willing, we'd like to talk to you about 
your wife's death. Maybe we missed something. Maybe you 
can give us some new leads.' The husband responds, 'O.K. 
I'll go over it again. Maybe I can help you.' Let's make it 
easy. He asks his brother to stay and the latter agrees to do so. 
The husband is not entitled to the Miranda warnings. As I 
see it, the test is no longer (if it ever was) how much in-
formation the police have when they approach a suspect, 
but how they approach him, whether he is being subjected 
to inherent or implicit or indirect pressure in a degree that 
requires the neutralizing, offsetting warnings. 
"One way we could test this hypothesis would be in the 
case of an undercover agent. Suppose a man is a prime 
suspect and, after consulting with the police, a confederate 
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of the suspect or a friend agrees to try to draw the suspect 
out about the crime-without revealing, of course, that he 
is working for the police, that he is, in effect, a government 
agent. By hypothesis, there is no coercion at all, not even 
of the subtle or indirect variety, because the suspect has no 
idea that he is talking to a government agent. He thinks 
he is only talking to a confederate or a friend. There is no 
badge, no uniform, no pressure in the atmosphere. As the 
law stands right now, I would say that, assuming the suspect 
has not yet been formally charged, and assuming further 
that the undisclosed government agent uses no objectionable 
interrogation tactics and utilizes no trickery or deception 
other than merely failing to disclose he is working with the 
police, the Miranda warnings need not be given, so that 
any resulting incriminating statements obtained without 
those warnings would be admissible. This would be true, as 
I see it, regardless of how much the law enforcement authori-
ties may have 'focused' on the suspect. 
"[Attorney General Thomas C.] LYNCH: I am wondering 
if there aren't some overtones of Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201 (1964), in the situation Professor Kamisar has 
just described? 
"KAMISAR: I assume that the man has not been indicted 
or otherwise formally charged. As I read Massiah, it applies 
only when a man has been formally charged or has retained 
counsel. Both these factors were present in Massiah. The 
Supreme Court has not outlawed the use of undercover 
agents as such. A long line of cases holds or assumes that 
an apparent friend or acquaintance who is really working 
with the authorities can engage the suspect in conversation 
and try to elicit an incriminating statement. The real battle 
has been over whether the friend or acquaintance may do so 
when 'wired for sound.' Even here, however, a majority of 
the Court to date has answered in the affirmative. Some 
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members of the Court have dissented, but their quarrel seems 
to be with the use of hidden microphones or hidden recorders 
on the person of the undercover agents, not with the employ-
ment of undercover agents as such. . . . 
"LYNCH: I think Professor Kamisar oversimplified the 
undercover agent illustration. He said the only deception 
that was practiced there was that the person was in plain 
clothes and that he did not disclose that he was an officer 
or working with an officer. Obviously in an undercover 
situation the person has to make some statements to the 
proposed defendant. For example, he says he is going to buy 
some narcotics from him. He explains why he has to buy 
them-either he is a dealer or he needs a shot for himself. 
How do you reconcile that with the expression of the Court, 
limited as it is, that you cannot use trickery and cajolery in 
obtaining the waiver? 
"(Judge George] EDWARDS: These refinements of what 
Miranda means are going to come up in the future to 
torture prosecuting attorneys and judges in the trial and 
appellate courts. But I want to suggest something very simple 
about this whole process as far as the police officer is con-
cerned. He has no need whatever to become involved in 
this sort of detailed consideration of whether or not a con-
fession under certain circumstances, or a volunteered state-
ment under certain circumstances, will be admissible. It 
seems to me he needs to keep in mind two specific things, 
and both of them are simple and relatively easy to apply. 
First, if he has restrained a man of his liberty in any significant 
way and is proceeding to question him, he must give the 
citizen the required warning. Second, whether he has re-
strained him or not, if he knows that the citizen is the 
prime suspect in relation to a crime and he plans to inter-
rogate him, he should give the warning. 
"As far as I am concerned, these are the two simple means 
C U S T 0 D Y vs. F 0 C U S I 347 
by which an officer can stay on the safe side of the Miranda 
requirements. If police want us to tell them how fine they 
can cut it, that is a different question ,and on that they will 
hear all sorts of fancy differences of opinion. But I doubt 
that anybody is going to contest the idea that to follow 
these two rules will leave the police safely within the 
Miranda opinion. 
"[Chief Vincent W.J PIERSANTE: I wanted to comment 
on the undercover officer's position because it is very im-
portant to law enforcement. Because the pre-arrest investiga-
tion is becoming more and more valuable to us, we will 
engage in more and more undercover operations. In my 
view the undercover operator is not engaging in interrogation 
in the sense in which we usually use the term. I want to 
back up Professor Kamisar's position that an undercover 
operator has freedom of operation outside of Miranda. 
"KAMISAR: We ought to deal in terms of what law 
enforcement men can continue to do in good faith. Reading 
the cases presently on the books reasonably and fairly, law 
enforcement officials may continue to engage in undercover 
work along the lines previously suggested. Now, I may be 
wrong in the case where the 'target' of the undercover agent 
is already a 'prime suspect.' It may be that Escobedo has not 
been displaced, as I think it has, and that Escobedo and 
Miranda stand alongside each each other and furnish the 
suspect double protection. My position, however, is that law 
enforcement authorities are entitled to proceed on the 
assumption that whether or not a man is a prime suspect 
they can proceed to question him without giving him the 
requisite warnings if the man is not being restrained or 
coerced but is really remaining 'voluntarily.' " 
A short few months after the aforementioned panel discussion 
was held, the U.S. Supreme Court came to grips with the work 
of the undercover agent in light of Massiah, Escobedo and Mir-
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anda and, it is submitted, lent considerable support to the view 
that the "focus" test was scrapped by Miranda. In Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 87 S. Ct. 408 (1966) one 
Partin, whom the Court assumed was a paid government informer, 
testified to several incriminating statements which he said Hoffa 
made about endeavoring to bribe the Test Fleet jury, although 
Hoffa had made these statements after a point in time when the 
government had sufficient ground for taking him into custody and 
charging him with this offense. The Court purported to be 
stunned by Hoffa's argument that since government agents could 
not have continued to question him without observance of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel if they had taken him into 
custody, evidence of statements made in the presence of Partin 
after the point in time when government agents could have taken 
him into custody likewise flouted his right to counsel. 
Retorted the Court, per Justice Stewart, 385 U.S. at 310: 
Nothing in Massiah, in Escobedo, or in any other case that 
has come to our attention, even remotely suggests this novel 
and paradoxical constitutional doctrine, and we decline to 
adopt it now. There is no constitutional right to be arrested. 
The police are not required to guess at their peril the 
precise moment at which they have probable cause to 
arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no 
constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation 
the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish 
probable cause . . . 
As has been pointed out however, "Hoffa's lawyers had simply 
chosen inartistic phrasing for an argument substantially drawn 
from the Court's own opinions," principally Escobedo's em-
phasis on "focus"; "when suspicion had focused on Hoffa the 
general investigation was functionally complete; at that point, 
he was the accused and thereby entitled to the absolute protection 
of the privilege against self-incrimination [and the protection 
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of counsel]." Note, judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE 
L. 1. 994, 1008 ( 1967). 
The Court also made short work of Hoffa's contention that his 
right under the Fifth Amendmem not to "be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself" was violated by 
the admission of Partin's testimony. Although Hoffa could hardly 
have been said to have made a "knowing and intelligent waiver" 
by talking to, and in the presence of, an apparent friend and 
court retainer in his entourage who was actually a secret govern-
ment agent, the Court considered it necessary only to deal with 
"compulsion" or "coercion," id., at 304: 
[A]ll have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory 
self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion. Thus, in the 
Miranda case, dealing with the Fifth Amendment's impact 
upon police interrogation of persons in custody, the Court 
predicated its decision upon the conclusion 'that without 
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of 
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the indi-
vidual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely .. .' 384 U.S., at 467. 
In the present case no claim has been or could be made that 
the petitioner's incriminating statements were the product of 
any sort of coercion, legal or factual. The petitioner's con-
versations were wholly voluntary. 
Since Partin had not actively elicited Hoffa's incriminating 
statements, another case decided the same day as Hoff a, Osborn 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L. Ed. 2d 394, 87 S. Ct. 429 
(1966), affirming the conviction of one of Hoffa's attorneys for 
endeavoring to bribe a prospective federal juror, seems to pose 
a stronger case for the applicability of Escobedo andjor Miranda. 
For the government spy in Osborn who posed as petitioner's 
"investigator" made at least an overture toward crime by men-
tioning that he knew some of the prospective jurors, and that 
one was his cousin, and in subsequent meetings, he told petitioner, 
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falsely, that he found his cousin "susceptible to money for 
hanging this jury." Moreover, when, in response to a detailed 
factual affidavit, the judges of the federal district court authorized 
federal agents to conceal a recorder on the person of petitioner's 
"investigator," in order to determine from recordings of future 
conversations between him and petitioner whether the latter was 
in fact trying to bribe a prospective juror, it _certainly seems that 
the investigation had "focused" on him. But neither the question 
of self-incrimination nor the right to counsel is considered in the 
Osborn opinion although Justice Douglas, the sole dissenter, 
protested: "Encouraging a person to talk into a concealed 'bug' 
may not be compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment. But allowing the transcript to be used against the accused 
is using the force and power of the law to make a man talk 
against his will ... " 385 U.S. at 351-52. 
An opportunity to shed further light on the scope of Massiah 
andjor Escobedo was lost when on the last day of the 1967-68 
Term, the Supreme Court, with four .Justices dissenting, 
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, 88 
Sup. Ct. -- (1968), in People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 
53 Cal. Rep. 720 (4th Dist., Div. 1, 1966). Petitioner was 
arrested for murder and was taken to a county jail, where she 
was booked on that charge and placed in a cell. Not only did 
she meet with counsel, but in an attempt to prevent questioning 
of his client, counsel set up a 24-hour-a-day watch of her cell. 
But an undercover agent was falsely booked into the jail on a 
fictitious charge and placed in petitioner's cell. Although this 
occurred prior to any formal charge being filed against petitioner, 
the agent remained in petitioner's cell, eliciting information 
after a complaint was formally filed charging petitioner with mur-
der or conversing with petitioner for two more days. In light of 
Massiah and Escobedo, the California District Court of Appeal 
viewed the law enforcement activity as "completely indefensible," 
"most inexcusable" and "almost incredible," but found that the 
admission of petitioner's statements was not "prejudicial error" 
and moreover, that objection to it was waived. 
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Dissenting from the dismissal of the writ and urging reversal, 
Justice Marshall, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Douglas 
and Brennan, indicated that even though petitioner had not yet 
been formally indicted, once petitioner had been arrested and 
booked for murder the investigation had "begun to focus on 
a particular suspect" and Massiah, as expanded by Escobedo, ap-
plied. The dissenters maintained, further, that whether or not 
the undercover agent "interrogated petitioner," "her presence 
itself was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a 
police agent." Id. at --. But the dissenters also assigned weight 
to the fact that "petitioner was in custody without bail, with a 
consequent lack of freedom to choose her companions"; she 
was represented by counsel at all times; a formal complaint had 
been filed before the agent had terminated her work in petitioner's 
cell; and the agent was more than a mere "listening post" -in 
various ways she deceived petitioner and subverted her rights. 
Id. at--. 
Moreover, the position of the dissenters is further beclouded 
by the fact that they did not consider the impact, if any, of 
Miranda on Massiah and Escobedo because, as they specifically 
noted, p. -- n. 14, petitioner's trial was begun more than a 
year prior to Miranda, thus rendering that decision inapplicable. 
"Volunteered" Statements vs. Statements Made in 
Response to "Interrogation" 
The Court pointed out in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478: 
Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. 
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any 
compelling influence, is of course, admissible in evidence. 
The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual 
is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the 
police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but 
whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement 
that police stop a person who enters a police station and 
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states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who 
calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement 
he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are 
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility 
is not affected by our holding today. (Emphasis added). 
Among the cases illustrating the points made in the passage 
just quoted are: 
Parson v. United States, 387 F. 2d 944 (lOth Cir., 1968) (on 
learning defendants were AWOL, a sheriff held them pending 
arrival of military authorities; when, in the course of trying to 
move defendants' car off the street, sheriff discovered the key 
found in personal effects of one defendant wouldn't work, sheriff 
claimed he was being given "runaround" about the key, where-
upon one defendant made the unresponsive remark that they 
had stolen the car and the other defendant confirmed this); 
State v. Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1966) (on hearing 
gun shots, officer immediately went to scene where he saw fatally 
wounded victim on sidewalk; on being told by bystander that a 
man had run into a nearby house the officer followed only to 
have defendant open the kitchen door and say: "I am the man 
you are looking for."); 
People v. Mercer, 64 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Ct. App. 2d Dist., Div. I, 
1968) (officer pursued and caught up with defendant who was 
attempting a jail break, but before officer could say anything, 
defendant volunteered: "I did it. No one else was involved."); 
In re Orr, 38 Ill. 2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424 (1967) (assuming 
arguendo that 1\1 iranda standards were extended to juveniles by 
Gault, those standards not violated where youth, though hand-
cuffed and removed from his grandmother's apartment to a police 
squad car by two officers with whom he was seated, stated, without 
any questioning, on way to police station that this "has been on my 
chest since it happened. I want to get it off."); 
Carwell v. State, 2 Md. App. 45, 232 A.2d 903 (Ct. Sp. App. 
Md., 1967) (responding to call that two men were breaking a 
storehouse window, officers confronted suspect at scene, showed 
him their badges and placed him under arrest, whereupon 
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suspect "blurted out": "I didn't break the window, the other 
boy did it."); 
Long v. State, 420 P.2d 158 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla., 1966) 
(defendant walked into police station, approached officer on duty 
and said, "I have stolen a car."); 
Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216 (1966) 
(two days after two small boys were found dead in a refrigerator, 
the boys' aunt, who knew investigating officer then visiting 
apartment, called him into a room, locked the door and told 
him she had closed dgor of refrigerator in which boys had 
perished); 
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 239 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. Pa., 1968) 
(robbery suspect, approached by police near scene of crime, 
volunteered: "I didn't rob that man. He owed me the money."); 
State v. Miller, 151 N.W.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. Wise., 1967) (former 
law enforcement officer agreed to go down to station; driving 
his own car on way down, he made incriminating statements, 
without any questions being asked, to officer who rode with him 
and whom he knew from former police work together). 
In a number of the aforementioned cases, however, the officer 
followed up the volunteered statements with a "Why did you 
shoot him?" (Intogna, supra; warning required because officer 
had drawn gun within 3 feet of defendant who was thus "deprived 
of his freedom in a significant way") or a "did what?" (Mercer, 
supra; response to this statement also admissible although no 
warnings given); or "Did you know the boys were in there?" and 
"Why did you do it?" (Eperjesi, supra; answers admissible with-
out warnings). Implicit in Eperjesi seems to be the explicit 
reasoning of Mercer: "The question put by the officer clearly 
followed a statement initiated and made by defendant." But as 
natural and understandable as it is for an officer to keep the 
flow of conversation going andjor to "clear up" some points 
once the suspect has volunteered an incriminating statement, 
such "follow-up" questions may well constitute "interrogation" 
within the meaning of Miranda. 
Miranda does say at one point that "by custodial interrogation 
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we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers aftet 
a person has been taken into custody ... " (384 U.S. at 444; 
emphasis added), suggesting that police questioning designed 
simply to clarify or amplify a statement volunteered by the 
suspect is not "interrogation," but on the same page the opinion 
also states that "prior to any questioning, the person must be 
warned ... " (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the Court points 
out elsewhere, p. 475-76, that "where in-custody interrogation is 
involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege 
is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some 
information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain 
silent when interrogated." In context, however, this may only 
mean that a defendant who has waived his rights after being 
given the requisite warnings is free to revoke that waiver at any 
time. 
It may be the line should be drawn between police questions 
(1) designed to clarify just what the suspect meant to say when 
he volunteered the statement (e.g. the officer responding "did 
what?" when the defendant volunteered "I did it" in Mercer) 
and (2) seeking to enhance defendant's guilt or raise the offense 
to a higher degree by, for example, getting at the defendant's 
state of mind as seems to have occurred in Intogna ("Why did you 
shoot him?") and Eperjesi ("Why did you do it?" and "Did you 
know the boys were in there?") and that only the category (2) 
"follow-up" questions should be considered "interrogation." In 
any event, it is a bit too glib and too loaded to frame the 
issue, as Justice Musmanno did for the court in Eperjesi, in terms 
of whether an officer should "refuse to listen" to a person at 
the scene of the crime he was investigating, 224 A.2d at 220, or 
whether Miranda was intended "to restrain a policeman from 
listening when statements are voluntarily made," ibid. The officer 
in that case did more than just "listen."a 
3. When this commentary was already in galleys, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
handed down a decision, State v. Perry, 14 Ohio St. 2d 256 (1968) which, 
on the basis of Eperjesi-type reasoning criticized in the text, held that 
Miranda did not apply to police questions "following up" a volunteered 
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Assuming arguendo that sometimes, at least, a "follow-up" 
question of a person who has volunteered a statement is "inter-
rogation," the Miranda warnings would still not be required if the 
person were not in "custody," as may have been the case in 
Eperjesi [See the discussion in the next section]. 
What of a statement made by defendant in response to a 
question asked of another person at the scene? Generally, this 
would be a "volunteered" statement, but if the defendant is 
already in custody the particular facts of a case may lead to a 
different conclusion. In Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713 
(lOth Cir., 1967) state officers stopped defendant and his woman 
companion, then driving the car, and arrested him for his mis-
use of an expired gasoline credit card at another town. When 
first stopped the defendant, referring to his companion, said: 
"Let her go; she didn't have anything to do with this; she 
doesn't know anything about it." While taking the couple to a 
nearby town where the credit card offense occurred, an officer 
asked the woman if it was her car [although it turned out later 
that the car was stolen, the arresting officers did not know that 
then] and the defendant interrupted to say: "No, it's my car. 
The car was given to me by my ex-wife in Indianapolis." The 
statement. Responding to a complaint about suspicious activities at a 
car wash, officers arrived at the scene, observed three men running from 
the side of a car wash building, and gave chase. 
On being caught, defendant blurted out that he had "never done 
anything like this before." An officer then asked him what he had done, 
eliciting the admission that defendant and his friends had decided to 
break into the car wash. Assuming, arguendo, that the officer was merely 
seeking "clarification of [defendant's] ambiguous, but inculpatory, ad· 
mission," as the court put it, 14 Ohio St. 2d at 262, when he asked 
this question-in light of the immediately preceding events it seems the 
officer should have had a pretty good idea of what defendant meant when 
he volunteered the statement-the next "follow up" question, how de-
fendant and his friends planned to break into the car wash, certainly 
seems to constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. In 
ruling that Miranda was inapplicable to the instant case, the court noted 
that "the officer was not required to prevent [defendant] from continuing 
his explanation of his activities at the scene," id. at 262, but it is sub-
mitted that the officer did a good deal more than that. 
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court took the position that Miranda does not prohibit such 
"volunteered" statements, but in light of the fact that defendant 
had earlier manifested considerable protectiveness toward his 
companion, it is arguable that subsequent questioning of her 
about the car in the presence of the defendant was likely, if not 
designed, to evoke a statement from him along the lines actually 
made. And it is submitted that it is not simply custody plus 
"questioning," as such, which calls for the Miranda safeguards 
but custody plus police conduct calculated to, expected to, or 
likely to, evoke admissions. 
Consider People v. Torres, 21 N.Y. 2d 49, 233 N.E. 2d 282 
( 1967) where the officer presented himself at defendant's apart-
ment with a search warrant (for possession of policy slips), 
exhibited the warrant and explained what it was. Before the 
officer said anything else, defendant replied: "The booklets are 
in the closet in the room, on top. You are going to find them 
anyway." Although the court conceded it was "arguable" that 
a defendant who is shown a search warrant covering his apart-
ment and person, is deprived of his freedom in a "significant 
way," even in his own home, 233 N. E. 2d at 285, it did not 
decide this issue but rather resolved the matter on the ground 
that defendant was never "questioned." 
Is it not also arguable, however, that exhibiting a search 
warrant and explaining its purpose is likely, if not calculated, 
to evoke an admission? Most courts would probably hold not, 
but suppose the facts are altered. Suppose the police locate and 
seize the incriminating physical evidence in the presence of 
defendant, who, realizing "the cat is out of the bag," then 
makes an incriminating statement? Or suppose, after seizing the 
evidence, the police simply stare at the defendant? Or flaunt the 
evidence before him? At some jJoint the police conduct must be 
regarded as "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, 
must it not? 
In State v. Gallicchio, 51 N . .J. 313, 240 A.2d 166 (1968), three 
witnesses viewed-defendant in a line-up. The first picked out 
defendant and the second was called to make the identification, 
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but before he had a chance to do so, defendant said: "You might 
as well go pick me out because everyone else will." As the court 
viewed it, defendant "was not being questioned when he made 
the statement;" rather "he volunteered it." (240 A.2d at 170) 
May it be argued that the way the police conducted the line-up 
procedure made it not improbable or unforeseeable that de-
fendant might make an incriminating statement and that there-
fore, before calling the three witnesses, the police should have 
advised defendant that any statement he made in reaction to an 
identification could be used against him, etc.? Probably few 
courts, if any, would so hold on Gallicchio-type facts, but 
Duckett v. State, 240 A.2d 332 (Ct. Spec. App. Md., 1968) dealt 
with a line-up or confrontation situation presenting a stronger 
case for the applicability of Miranda. There, although the rape-
kidnapping victim and her husband had already identified de-
fendant on three prior occasions as a participant in the crimes, 
the police arranged still another face to face confrontation 
between defendant and the victim and her husband, at which 
time defendant made an incriminating statement. Since the 
court reversed on other grounds, it did not rule on the admissi-
bility of the statement, but it did manifest puzzlement at the 
motive and purpose of the police in arranging the fourth con-
frontation (240 A.2d at 341-42). 
Compare Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
where Judge Wright, concurring in the result, expressed curiosity 
and concern over the fact that since the court, in a 1959 decision, 
had held admissible, over a Mallory objection, defendant's state-
ment at a line-up, on the ground that it was made "spontaneously" 
and not as a result of interrogation, suggestion or instigation of 
the police, '"spontaneous' apologies by defendants [at other 
line-ups or confrontations with the complaining witness] have 
been offered by the Government and received in evidence . . . 
with unusual frequency-usually supported by testimony that the 
apologies were not suggested or inspired by the police"- although 
in the instant case, at least, one complaining witness had testified 
to the contrary. (344 F.2d at 542-43). It seems fairly clear that 
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if the statement at the confrontation is suggested or instigated 
by the police, as appears to have happened in Veney (where the 
police said to the defendant, "Do you want to say anything to 
the people [the complaining witnesses]?" and after being met 
with silence repeated, "Don't you want to say anything?"), any 
resulting "apology" or other incriminating statement should be 
inadmissible, absent the Miranda warnings. 
What of a statement made by defendant in response to an 
accusation by another person at the scene? In State v. Oxentine, 
270 N.C. 412, 154 S.E. 2d 529 ( 1967), an officer arrived in 
defendant's house, observed deceased lying face down beside 
the kitchen table in the midst of beer cans and asked a crying 
girl who had shot the deceased. She named the defendant, who, 
standing back at the doorway of the other room, responded: 
"Yes, I shot him." The court ruled the statement admissible on 
two grounds-each of which seems correct-(1) at the time he 
made the statement, defendant had not been "taken into custody" 
or "deprived of his freedom" and (2) he was not being "ques-
tioned" within the intent and meaning of Miranda. Moreover, 
it seems unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the officer to 
interject the Miranda warning in the course of such rapid-fire, 
on-the-scene conversation. However, if, following the bystander's 
accusation, the police had taken defendant into custody and 
"followed up" the accusation, e.g., "You heard the lady; is she 
right?" or "What about it?" the result would seem to be otherwise. 
If, after taking defendant into custody, the police had simply 
stared at defendant-with the bystander's accusation still "ringing 
in the room"-defendant's incriminating statement might also be 
inadmissible. 
What if defendant makes an incriminating statement while 
filling out the forms in connection with the "booking procedure" 
or while otherwise being asked his name or address? Although 
the question is not entirely free from doubt, it seems that just 
as the absence of police questioning, as such, does not always 
preclude a finding of "custodial interrogation" so routine police 
"questioning" not related to the investigation of the case nor 
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designed, expected or likely to elicit information relevant to 
guilt may not amount to "custodial interrogation" within the 
meaning of Miranda. Reconsider Parson v. United States, dis-
cussed supra at p. 352; see Williams v. United States, 391 F.2d 221 
(5th Cir. 1968); Clarke v. State, 240 A.2d 291 (Ct. Spec. App. Md., 
1968) (defendant gave name, address and place of employment 
in response to booking officer's request for such information, but 
if, when asked to supply such routine identification, defendant 
had unresponsively made incriminating statements, court's rea-
soning would have permitted use of such statements absent 
Miranda warnings.) To the same effect are pre-Miranda California 
cases applying the Escobedo-Dorado rule: People v. Pike, 48 Cal. 
Rptr. 575, 578 (Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist., 1966); People v. Propp, 
45 Cal. Rptr. 690, 705 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist., 1965). 
Police custody, without more, generates certain anxieties and 
pressures, but as the Mercer, Miller and Orr cases, discussed 
supra at pp. 352-3 illustrate, and as the language of the Miranda 
opinion makes fairly clear, "custody," although inherently coer-
cive, is not enough to bring the Miranda warnings into play. 
Justice White underscores this point in his Miranda dissent, 384 
U.S. at 533: 
[T]he [majority] says that the spontaneous product of the 
coercion of arrest and detention is still to be deemed volun-
tary. An accused, arrested on probable cause, may blurt out 
a confession which will be admissible despite the fact that 
he is alone and in custody, without any showing that he had 
any notion of his right to remain silent or of the consequences 
of his admission. 
When a person in custody is "subjected to interrogation" 
about his guilt, additional pressures are created which increase 
the need to advise him of his rights because, as the Chief Justice 
observed in Miranda, id. at 468: 
It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb 
to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or ex-
pressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a 
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confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation 
is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury 
[noting at this point that Lord Devlin has commented that 
'there is still a general belief that you must answer all 
questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will 
be the worse for you if you do not.'] 
It is submitted, however, that absent special circumstances such 
questions as "Where do you live?" or "Do you want us to get 
you a sandwich?" do not add to the pressures generated by police 
custody and therefore unresponsive incriminating statements made 
in reply to such questions should be viewed as equivalent to 
"blurted out" statements.4 
"General On-the-scene Questioning" or "General 
Questioning of Citizens" vs. "Custodial Interrogation" 
The Miranda opinion points out, 384 U.S. at 477-78: 
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional 
function of police officers in investigating crime. . .. When 
an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police 
may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at 
trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry 
of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene ques-
tioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general 
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not 
affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizen-
4. Cf. Rule II of the English Judge's Rules: "As soon as a police officer has 
evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a 
person has committed an offense, he shall caution that person or cause 
him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions or further 
questions relating to that offence." (Emphasis added.) 
But see Commentary to A.L.I., Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure §A5.08 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968) at pp. 27-28 to the effect that it 
is not improper for the police to ask "routine questions unrelated to the 
investigation of the case," but "if such non-investigative questioning does 
happen to produce an incriminatory statement, it must be excluded from 
evidence unless the proper warnings were issued and a valid waiver was 
obtained." 
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ship for individuals to give whatever information they may 
have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the 
compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody 
interrogation is not necessarily present [noting, at this point, 
p. 478 n. 46, the observation of a Scottish court that modern 
police interrogation practices 'create a situation very un-
favourable to the suspect,' unlike former times, when ques-
tioning 'would be conducted by police officers visiting the 
house or place of business of the suspect and there questioning 
him, probably in the presence of a relation or friend.'] 
(Emphasis added.) 
Typical of cases finding "general questioning of citizens in 
the fact-finding process" are: 
United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir., 1968) (alterna-
tive holdings that (1) warnings given were adequate under 
Miranda and (2) even if not, defendant was "not 'in custody'-
indeed, the interviews were held on a park bench and in a 
Schrafft's restaurant;" but this does not necessarily render Miranda 
applicable and a more detailed description of circumstances would 
seem in order); 
United States v. Essex, 275 F. Supp. 393, 397-98 (E.D. Tenn., 
1967) (defendant invited two federal agents into her living room, 
pointing out that "she had been expecting a visit from the FBI"; 
no charge had been made against her and no indictment returned 
against her until a year after this "investigative interview"); 
Tillery v. State, 238 A.2d 125 (Ct. Sp. App. Md., 1968) unaware 
that defendant had been shot attempting a robbery and not 
suspecting him of any crime, officer questioned defendant in 
hospital merely as a victim of a shooting); 
People v. Gilbert, 8 Mich. App. 393, 154 N.W. 2d 800, 801 
(Ct. App. Mich., 1967) (defendant questioned about fatal accident 
in which he was involved as "he freely walked about the hospital 
corridors and emergency room;" he was "in no way isolated for 
questioning and the period of interrogation was of short dura-
tion;" although the facts given seem to support result, court also 
suggests Miranda should be limited to facts of cases before 
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Supreme Court when it wrote the opinion, e.g., persons under 
"formal arrest" and subjected to "general atmosphere of psycho-
logical compulsion," which seems to be unduly restrictive reading 
of Miranda); 
Commonwealth v. Barclay, 240 A.2d 838 (Super. Ct. Pa., 1968) 
(officer interviewed defendant in his living room, in presence of 
both his wife and father, informing him that he had a complaint 
that defendant was involved in a "drag race;" Hoffman, J., 
dissents, maintaining that officer had "focused" on defendant 
by the time he went to his home and-what this writer believes 
is more to the point-that defendant "knew immediately he was 
the focal point of the investigation.") 
What determines whether a person being questioned is "in 
custody"? (1) The subjective intention of the questioning officer 
to hold the person or to arrest him? (2) The degree to which the 
investigation has "focused" on the person or, a variation of the 
same approach, whether or not the police have "probable cause" 
to arrest the person? (3) The subjective belief of the person that 
he is significantly deprived of his freedom? (4) The belief of the 
person, as "a reasonable man," that his freedom is significantly 
impaired? It is submitted that approach (4) should be con-
trolling. 
People v. Glover, 52 Misc., 2d 425, 276 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (Sup. 
Ct. Bx. Cy., 1966) and People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 
N. Y. S. 2d 249 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cy., 1966), rev'd mem. (3-2), 
28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N. Y. S. 2d 602 (2d Dep't, 1967) take 
the view, erroneously, it is submitted, that "custodial interroga-
tion" turns on whether the police have probable cause to arrest 
the person being questioned or whether their suspicion has 
"focused" on him. At one point, Justice Chimera states flatly 
in Glover, 276 N.Y. S. 2d at 466: "[W]hatever else Miranda may 
have intended 'custody' to mean, this much is apparent-police 
questioning of a person wherever detained, upon whom suspicion 
has already focused, appears ruled to be 'custodial interrogation.' " 
In the much-discussed Allen case, Justice Sobel also advances the 
view that the subjective intention of the officer to hold or to 
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arrest the person being questioned constitutes an independent 
basis for finding that "custodial questioning" is taking place. 
In Allen, police officers accompanied by the complaining wit-
ness (defendant's mother-in-law, who claimed he had raped her) 
and the complaining witness' paramour, went to defendant's 
house and asked the defendant in the presence of his wife (the 
alleged victim's daughter) whether he had committed the rape. 
Justice Sobel found that defendant was "in custody" at the time 
this question was asked, because the officers had admitted that 
they went to defendant's house "for the purpose of making an 
arrest" and because they would not have permitted the defendant 
to leave before questioning him, 50 Misc. 2d at 899, 272 N .Y.S. 
2d at 251. 
Justice Sobel was quite correct when he pointed out that "it 
does not matter that the question was asked in the defendant's 
home upon 'first' custody rather than in the police station," but 
he was in error, it is submitted, when he deemed it conclusive 
that "quite obviously the defendant in the instant case was 'on 
target' and was 'not free to go.' " 50 Misc. 2d at 900, 272 N .Y.S. 
2d at 252. 
Justice Sobel's views on this point have been spelled out in 
his valuable monograph, THE NEw CoNFESSION STANDARDS 60-61 
(1966): 
Whether his judgment was right or wrong, if [the police 
officer's] subjective intention was to hold the person, then 
that particular person was not 'free to go.' He was in 'custody.' 
[citing the Allen case] In this same regard, the belief of the 
person detained that he was not 'free to go' is of no con-
sequence. The issue is not 'coercion.' Only the fact of 'custody' 
is of consequence. If he was in fact 'free to go,' it should 
not matter that subjectively he believed he was not. One 
who is 'free to go' is not under legal 'compulsion.' His 
answers may be used against him. 
The 'objective test' is required when the police officer 
testifies at the admissibility hearings that the person detained 
was in fact 'free to go.' In such a situation, the officer may 
364 / "C U S T 0 D I A L I N T E R R 0 G A T I 0 N" 
honestly believe that the person detained was 'free to go.' 
His belief is relevant but not by any means controlling. 
The prime inquiry is into the existence of probable cause. 
If indeed the police officer had probable cause to arrest, his 
protestations that the person detained was 'free to go' must 
be ignored. It must be presumed that a police officer will do 
his duty; if he has probable cause, he will arrest. The 
existence of probable cause establishes 'custody.' 
As already indicated in the discussion of "CusTODY" vs. "Focus," 
supra, p. 338-50, this writer is of the view (and believes Hoffa and 
Osborn make clear) that neither the intent to arrest, nor the 
existence of probable cause, nor the fact that defendant is "on 
target" establishes "custody" within the meaning of Miranda. 
Justice Sobel's views to the contrary notwithstanding, the "fact 
of custody" cannot be established without regard to the im-
pressions or beliefs of the person being questioned. If the de-
fendant does feel ''free to go" then regardless of the uncom-
municated intent of the officers or their possession of "probable 
cause" to arrest, he is not "in custody;" the pressures and anxieties 
generated by custodial interrogation are not operating and thus 
there is no need to give the neutralizing, offsetting Miranda 
warnings. 
Since the trial in Commonwealth v. jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 
226 A.2d 765 (1967) took place more than a year prior to 
Miranda, that landmark decision was not applicable, but the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, per Eagen, J., took footnote 4 in 
the Miranda opinion, discussed supra at p. 339, too seriously, and 
seemed to say by way of dictum that once the investigation had 
"begun to focus" on defendant "as the accused she was 'in 
custody,'" apparently within the meaning of Miranda. (226 A.2d 
at 768). 
Investigating a stabbing, an officer went to a hospital and 
asked "all those present in the accident ward" (including de-
fendant, who had a towel over her forehead and left eye) and 
"no one in particular": "What happened?" Defendant made an 
incriminating statement in reply. It seems clear that neither 
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under Escobedo nor Miranda did this question have to be pre-
ceded by warnings. This was a general inquiry into an unsolved 
crime within the meaning of Escobedo and "general questioning 
of citizens in the fact-finding process" within the meaning of 
Miranda. 
A second officer arrived at the hospital, however, and after a 
"briefing" by the first officer, the newly arrived officer entered 
the ward to ask: "Who did the stabbing?" Again, defendant made 
an incriminating statement in reply. But at this point, although 
the Jefferson opinion indicates otherwise, the rationales of 
Escobedo and Miranda lead to different results. The questioning 
situation had changed from a general inquiry "to one which 
focused on a particular suspect for the purpose of eliciting a 
question," 226 A.2d at 768, but it seems that defendant was not 
yet "in custody." The court suggested, however, that she was, ibid: 
"[A]fter [defendant's] admissions to [the first officer], the investi-
gation had certainly begun to focus on her as the accused; and, 
she was certainly not free to leave and [was] at least technically 
'in custody.' " 
It is unclear whether the fact that the investigation had 
"begun to focus" on defendant and the fact that she was not 
"free to leave" were alternative grounds for concluding that she 
was in custody, but even in combination, for reasons set forth 
above, these factors would not seem to amount to "custody" 
within the meaning of Miranda. 
People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y. 2d 1, 233 N.E. 2d 
255 (1967) explicitly rejects the reasoning in Jefferson, supra, 
and, by implication, the reasoning in Allen and Glover as well, 
but, for reasons discussed below, seems to give Miranda an unduly 
restrictive reading. 
In Rodney P., one youth, arrested in connection with a car 
theft, admitted his involvement and identified defendant as his 
accomplice. A detective went to the vicinity of defendant's. home, 
asked which of the three youths standing outside was defendant 
and when the defendant, a 16 year-old, identified himself, the 
detective asked the other two youths to leave, which they did. 
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After questioning defendant for some three or four minutes about 
being with the youth who had already admitted his involvement 
in the theft (although apparently this was not communicated to, 
defendant), defendant also admitted his involvement. 
A 5-2 majority of the New York Court of Appeals, per Keating, 
J ., held that defendant was not subjected to "custodial inter-
rogation," and therefore the Miranda warnings need not have 
been given, relying heavily on People v. Arnold, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
115, 120, 426 P.2d 515, 520 (1967) ("custody occurs if the suspect 
is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way or is led to believe) as a reasonable person, that he is so 
deprived") (emphasis added) and People v. Hazel, 60 Cal. Rptr, 
437 (Ct. App. lst Dist., Div. I, 1967) (to the same effect). Wrote 
Judge Keating, 233 N.E. at 260-61: 
This [the test applied by the California courts] is the test 
which we hold to be the most reasonable. It gives effect to 
the purpose of the Miranda rules; it is not solely dependent 
either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers 
or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden 
of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person 
whom they question .... Applying the rule to the facts in 
the case at bar, we conclude that the .Miranda warnings need 
not have been given. The police drove up to the front of the 
defendant's home, a private dwelling. The defendant and two 
friends were on the side steps of the house. One of the 
detectives got out of the car, approached the defendant and, 
quite properly, asked to speak to him privately regarding a 
matter which might prove to be embarrassing. The defendant 
was not told that he was under arrest when he responded 
to the questions outside his home-'in [his own] backyard' 
to use his counsel's words-nor was he physically restrained in 
any way. The fact that he might have been restrained, had 
he attempted to leave, is not controlling .... Nor can it be 
said that the defendant was led 'as a reasonable person' to 
believe that his freedom was restrained in any significant way. 
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There is no evidence that the police officer had his gun 
drawn5 • • • or that the defendant knew or was advised that 
his accomplice was already in custody and had implicated 
him .... '[T]he conversation took ... [n]o more than three 
or four minutes.' 
This kind of questioning is little different from routine 
police investigation of crimes or suspicious conduct at a 
person's home, his place of business or on the street-the kind 
of questioning which has uniformly held not to require the 
Miranda warnings .... 
The Rodney P. majority also dwelt on the fact that Miranda 
had stressed that even the modern police interrogation practice 
"is predicated upon psychological coercion," 233 N .E. 2d at 257; 
that in all the cases before the Court in Miranda the defendant 
had been detained and interrogated in police stations, in an 
"atmosphere" which "carries its own badge of intimidation," 
ibid.; criticized the jefferson case because its reasoning "overlooks 
the language and purpose of the Miranda warnings which is to 
protect the individual's freedom of choice-to answer or not 
answer-in situations which are inherently coercive," id. at 259; 
maintained that the determination of "custodial interrogation" 
"must ... be based upon a careful examination of the holding 
of Miranda, the purpose of the Supreme Court in requiring the 
four-fold warning and the evil which the Court resolved to 
eradicate," id. at 257; and concluded, id. at 261: 
[W]e believe that, in prefacing the word 'restraint' with the 
adjective 'significant,' the Supreme Court intended that the 
warnings be given when the questioning takes place under 
5. In People v. Shivers, 21 N.Y. 2d ll8, 233 N.E. 2d 836 (1967), decided one 
month after Rodney P., a 4-3 majority of the New York Court of Appeals, 
per Fuld, C.J., held that even brief questioning of a suspect at the scene 
by an officer who has drawn his gun is "custodial interrogation," agreeing 
with the dissent below that "a drawn and pointed revolver has no 
ambiguity, and its compulsion is manifest. The threat is direct and the 
need to comply immediate." To similar effect is State v. Intogna, 101 
Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1966). But cf. Hill v. State, discussed infra, p. 374. 
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circumstances which are likely to affect substantially the 
individual's 'will to resist and compel him to speak where 
he would not otherwise do so freely.' ... Such circumstances 
were not present here. 
Burke, J., joined by Fuld, C.J., dissented, contending (233 
N.E. 2d at 262-63): 
The majority opinion has construed 'the language and 
purpose of * * * Miranda' to be the protection of the 
individual's freedom of choice-to answer or not answer-
in situations which are inherently coercive. To reduce 
Miranda to situations where a person feels compelled to 
respond to an inquiry is, in my opinion, an illogical distortion 
of the term 'freedom of action.' The 'purpose' behind 
Miranda notwithstanding, 'freedom of action' is a· concept 
logically independent of 'compulsion to speak.' The Supreme 
Court, for whatever its reasons, declared that these four-fold 
warnings must be given when a suspect's freedom of action 
is 'significantly' impaired. This is all we are called upon to 
decide here. It is not our task under Miranda to consider 
whether in laying down this rule the Supreme Court may 
have in fact laid down a rule broader than was necessary to 
achieve the purposes for which it was formulated. Our 
task is only to apply that rule. 
The majority itself proposes a rule which I believe accords 
with the dictates of Miranda, namely, in requiring that the 
warnings be given whenever a suspect either is in fact or 
reasonably believes himself to be deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way. In applying this rule to the 
case at bar, however, the majority introduces the extraneous 
consideration of whether or not there were, in addition, 
elements of compulsion to answer the arresting officer's 
questions. The latter element is not only irrelevant to a 
determination of whether the Miranda warnings were re-
quired, its application generally will require our courts and 
law enforcement officials to become involved in every case 
such as this in the extremely difficult process of assessing 
Q U E 5 T I 0 N I N G / 369 
whether or not the coercive aspects of the situation were such 
as to compel the suspect to answer the questions of an 
arresting officer, not merely whether or not a reasonable man 
would have felt his freedom of action significantly impaired. 
Rejecting this concept of 'purpose' and accepting for the 
moment the test proposed by the majority, I am of the 
opinion that the defendant was here deprived of his freedom 
of action in a significant way at the time that he made these 
oral admi~sions. When the detective approached him, it is 
clear that defendant was the only suspect as far as a possible 
accomplice was concerned. The 'fact-finding' stage had been 
concluded. The police investigation had reached the 'accusa-
torial stage.' Immediately following his meeting with the 
defendant, the detective directed his two friends to leave 
them alone. His initial inquiry was whether Rodney P. 
knew Daniel W., the youth who was arrested and who had 
implicated him. After an affirmative response, the detective 
pressed the defendant and succeeded in eliciting the oral 
admission. This statement strikes me as an admission made 
by a suspect under circumstances which violate the rule laid 
down in Miranda. I do not understand how any conclusion 
can be reached other than that it was reasonable for this 
16-year old youth, who had been isolated from his com-
panions and questioned specifically with regard to the com-
mission of a crime, to believe that he would be detained 
until the question was answered to the satisfaction of the 
detective. This conclusion is in accord with the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Miranda. Yet the majority, by applying 
their test, does not arrive at this result. 
* * * 
In formulating a purposive interpretation of Miranda, I 
am in accord with the majority that a subjective approach 
hinging upon the particular defendant's analysis of a situa-
tion would impose an unreasonable burden upon law en-
forcement agencies, requiring them to anticipate a person's 
'frailties or idiosyncrasies.' However, I disagree with their 
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rejection of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's application 
of Miranda in Commonwealth v. Jefferson. . . . There, 
the defendant was truly a suspect in technical custody. 
Miranda, as I view it requires an answer to the hypothetical 
'If the person had remained silent or expressly refused to 
answer under privilege of self-incrimination, would the 
police have permitted him to leave?' 
(1) Insofar as Judge Burke criticizes the Rodney P. majority 
for indicating that "custodial interrogation" might be limited 
to "inherently coercive" circumstances or to those situations 
which are likely to affect substantially the individual's "will to 
resist," the dissenting opinion's criticism is well taken. A person 
significantly deprived of his freedom by an officer who then 
asks him questions relating to the crime being investigated is 
entitled to the Miranda warnings without regard to whether his 
plight amounts to, or approaches, the pressures operating on the 
defendants in the 1\.1 iranda cases or those working on one being 
subjected to the psychological coercion recommended in police 
interrogation manuals. See the discussion of PoLICE STATION IN-
TERROGATION VS. "FIELD INTERROGATION," supra at 336-7. To put 
it another way, when a suspect, who may reasonably conclude 
that his freedom has been significantly restrained by a police 
officer, is questioned about his guilt by the officer, it must be 
conclusively presumed that his "will to resist" has been substan-
tially affected. 
(2) Insofar as Judge Burke argues that (a) once the police 
investigation has "focused on" a suspect or reached the "accusa-
torial stage" or (b) once the police have made the decision, 
whether or not communicated, not to let the suspect go, the 
suspect is "in custody," it is submitted, for the reasons advanced 
in the discussion of Allen, Glover and Jefferson, supra, that he is 
in error. 
(3) Whether or not the suspect in Rodney P. could and did 
reasonably conclude that his liberty was significantly restrained, 
i.e., that he would not be free to leave unless and until he did 
answer questions to the satisfaction of the detective, as dissenting 
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.Judge Burke believes, is unclear. (The defendant did not testify 
at the suppression hearing.) The awareness of the person being 
questioned by an officer that he has become the "focal point" 
of the investigation, or that the police already have ample cause 
to arrest him, may well lead him to conclude, as a reasonable 
person, that he is not free to leave, that he has been significantly 
deprived of his freedom, but the Rodney P. majority does not focus 
on this issue, nor is this point addressed in the Allen, Glover and 
jefferson cases. 
Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) also 
fails to consider the extei'it to which defendant realized that the 
investigation had focused on him, deeming it controlling that 
federal agents must have regarded him the "focal point." The 
salient facts in Windsor are as follows: Earlier in the day, 
defendant and his companion had been stopped in an automobile 
by local police for a traffic violation. When the companion failed 
to prove ownership of the vehicle, the local police contacted 
the FBI. Defendant's companion admitted to federal agents that 
the car was stolen and that he and defendant had driven it 
across state lines. The FBI agents then went to defendant's motel, 
talked to some persons at the motel for "background information" 
and upon entering the room belonging to these persons, in 
the presence of defendant, spotted and seized a gun which 
defendant identified as his. The agents then told defendant they 
had the key to the motel room he and his companion shared and 
asked defendant to accompany him to this room, which he did. 
Before questioning defendant, one agent then told defendant, 
inter alia, that he was not under arrest and was not being detained 
in any way and that he could terminate the interview at any 
time. 
Nevertheless the court ruled inadmissible the incriminating 
statements obtained from defendant in the motel room absent 
the full Miranda warning, 389 F.2d at 535: 
The focus of the investigation was clearly and unmistakably 
upon [defendant] while he was being interrogated. In effect 
he was already being detained and in custody or being 
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deprived of his freedom in a significant way .... [Defendant's 
companion] had already given the agents sufficient evidence 
for them to conclude that [defendant] was also involved in 
the inter-state transportation of the stolen car. There was, 
therefore, probable cause to arrest him .... [Defendant] 
was definitely the central figure in their investigation [and 
should have been given the full Miranda warning before 
the motel room questioning began]. 
For reasons already discussed at length, the court's test, al-
though responsive to Escobedo, seems unresponsive to Miranda. 
However, the court might have reached the same result by a 
different route. Although these aspects of the case are not clear, 
because the court doesn't address itself to them, defendant 
probably realized that his companion had already told the 
federal agents of their involvement in the crime, and had given 
the agents the key to their room. If so, then despite the agent's 
words to the contrary, defendant might reasonably have con-
cluded that being the "central figure" in the case he really 
wasn't "free to go"-at least not very far. The seizure of de· 
fendant's gun a short time earlier might reasonably be expected 
to contribute to this conclusion. 
The "focus" test was also applied in People v. Ceccone, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 2d Dist., Div. 3, 1968). After stopping 
defendant for a traffic violation and in the course of inquiring 
about defendant's proof of ownership of the car, the officer 
spotted on the floor of the car capsules, which appeared to him 
to contain dexedrine, and a wax paper bag, which, when the 
officer picked it up and opened it, appeared to him to contain 
marijuana. The officer then showed defendant the capsules and 
the contents of the bag, asking him whether he knew what they 
were. Defendant denied knowing what the capsules were, but 
admitted that the bag contained marijuana. 
The court threw out this incriminating statement because the 
investigation had focused upon defendant, the officer had ample 
cause to arrest him for narcotics violations (and driving a stolen 
vehicle) and could not be expected to permit him to leave. 
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Thus, a permissible general on-the-scene questioning had become 
"a custodial interrogation." (67 Cal. Rptr. at 503.) This approach 
has already been criticized at length. The court went on to say, 
and it is submitted that it was on sounder ground when 
it did, that at the point when defendant was asked what the bag 
contained, "the prior questioning could have led defendant, as 
a reasonable person, to believe that he was not free to depart. 
Therefore, he was in custody and should have been warned of his 
rights before being questioned." (Ibid.) 
Although the "general on-the-scene questioning" and "general 
questioning of citizens" language allows the state and lower 
federal courts a considerable amount of maneuverability in 
applying 1\firanda to particular fact situations, some cases seem 
to have taken excessive liberties with these concepts: 
United States v. Delamarra, 275 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C., 1967) 
(defendant building custodian went to university to pick up his 
check when told to report to university safety and security 
officer, in charge of guards, in guard's briefing room; in this 
room both security officer and city police sergeant questioned 
him about recent theft from university safe; when university 
official left room, sergeant continued to question defendant and 
when latter implicated a guard, sergeant asked official to return 
and hear what defendant had said; when official found dis-
crepancies in the accusation, defendant then made incriminating 
statements; court's view that questioning was "only ... part 
of a general investigation," 275 F. Supp. at 4, seems strained, 
and its observation that "there is no need for Miranda warnings 
to be given to all who choose to cooj;erate with law enforcement 
officers in furtherance of a still general investigation," ibid. 
(emphasis added), seems far removed from reality of instant 
case; certainly at point when defendant was asked about dis-
crepancies in his story, if not earlier, he must have realized he 
was in deep trouble and hardly free to leave); 
Duffy v. State, 243 Md. 425, 221 A.2d 653 (Court of Appeals, 
1966) (acting on information supplied by two youths who 
admitted participating in a robbery and stabbing, two officers 
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went to a bedroom where defendant was sleeping, seized a knife 
under the mattress of defendant's bed, then aroused defendant, 
greeting him with the query, "Is this the knife you used in the 
fight?"-it turned out that it was-eliciting incriminating state-
ment from defendant; court views Escobedo and Miranda in-
applicable to confession gleaned from a suspect "merely accosted 
by the police," 221 A.2d at 656; but this seems an unrealistic, 
euphemistic way of describing circumstances; defendant must 
have concluded-certainly a reasonable man would have-on being 
awakened by uniformed officers, one of whom was flaunting the 
weapon used in the crime, and asking him a pointed question, 
that officers had a great deal "on him" and that his liberty was 
significantly curtailed); 
Hill v. State, 420 S.W. 2d 408 (Ct. Crim. App. Texas, 1967) 
(after spotting defendant crawling out of bushes covering the 
broken window of an office building which he had previously 
observed, officer drew his revolver, bringing defendant to an 
abrupt halt and leading him to holler, "don't shoot, don't shoot;" 
upon being handcuffed, defendant, "responding to the officer's 
questions, denied having a weapon and related that 'just one' 
more man was in the building," 420 S.W. 2d at 409; but court 
holds statements admissible, in absence of .Miranda warnings, 
with cryptic comment that 1\lliranda does not apply to "res gestae 
statements such as the one made under the circumstances here 
described," id. at 411; but it is not apparent why not); 
The difficulties involved in determining precisely at what 
point "on-the-scene" or "general" questioning becomes "cus-
todial interrogation" are well illustrated by two very recent 
federal appellate decisions: Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476 
(D.C. Cir., 1968) and United States v. Gibso11, 392 F.2d 373 
(4th Cir., 1968). 
In Allen, in the early hours of the morning, an officer stopped 
a car being driven at "an extremely slow speed with headlights 
off," intending to issue a traffic citation. The officer asked de-
fendant to prodtn:e his driver's permit and automobile registra-
tion, noticing another man (.Jeffries) in the car, "slumped over 
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in the right rear seat, whose 'face was. beyond recognition,' 
bleeding profusely about the head." Defendant replied he did not 
have a permit or registration. The officer then asked defendant 
who owned the car, where it came from and where he had 
gotten it, to all of which defendant answered that he did not 
know. 
The officer then asked the injured man in the rear seat whether 
he owned the car (the reply was mumbled and unintelligible) and 
whether he had been beaten, and if so, by whom. Again, the 
response was an unintelligible mumble, but this time it was 
accompanied by a gesture-the injured man, whom the officer 
knew had been drinking, raised his hand and pointed to de-
fendant. The officer then turned to defendant and asked him 
whether he had beaten Jeffries. Defendant replied in the affirma-
tive. 
Judge Leventhal's comments, in the course of ruling that the 
Miranda warnings need not have been given under the circum-
stances, are quite sound in the abstract and as applied to police 
questioning of defendant about his driver's permit and car 
registration, but, it is submitted, questionable as applied to the 
admissibility of defendant's statement that he had beaten Jeffries. 
Observed .Judge Leventhal (390 F.2d at 478-79): 
Whether police have left the channel of 'investigation' 
and run onto the shoals of 'custodial interrogation' cannot 
be determined by reference to some chart clearly designating 
the various lights, bells, buoys and other channel markers. 
Nor is it possible or desirable to simplify the matter by 
saying that whenever any officer is prepared to detain an 
individual he may not ask any questions. Such a rule would 
venerate form over the substance of sound relations between 
police and citizens in a large community. \Ve think the 
relative routineness of an inquiry is a material indicator 
that the police are still in a state of investigation. The police 
talk to too many people in the course of a day to make 
warnings compulsory every time they inquire into a situation. 
Such a requirement would hamper and perhaps demean 
376 / "C U S T 0 D I A l I N T E R R 0 G A T I 0 N" 
routine police investigation. Indeed excessive admonitions 
are likely to make cooperative and law-abiding citizens 
anxious and fearful out of proportion to the need for 
admonitions in advising prime suspects of their rights. 
Miranda specifically permits general on-the-street investi-
gation of citizens not under restraint .... But obviously 
citizens are subject to some detention even in that kind of 
investigation. We think some inquiry can be made as part of 
an investigation notwithstanding limited and brief restraints 
by the police in their effort to screen crimes from relatively 
routine mishaps. It is not uncommon for citizens to forget 
their permits and registration cards. That this mishap 
produces incidental detention and restraint while the pos-
sibility of a stolen car is checked out, perhaps so brief as to 
be virtually unappreciated by the person involved, does not 
produce the kind of custodial situation contemplated by 
the Miranda doctrine. 
The question as to the assault on Jeffries is more difficult. 
Appellant's counsel artfully dramatizes the situation by 
saying that Jeffries had already literally pointed the finger 
at appellant. In context, however, what we see is an officer 
taking account of a bleeding man. He asks, who beat you?-
and gets only a mumble, for the man is drunk. The officer 
could not know what the beaten man was trying to indicate, 
or whether he was in a position to make or report any 
observation. What did the man mean by his finger-that 
appellant hit him? That appellant knew who did? The 
police officer thought it was unusual that a man was lying 
on the right rear seat. But what did it mean? Was the 
driver taking the man for a hostile ride? Or to the hospital? 
An assault is a misdemeanor, and not every fracas is an 
assault. The courts must look to the essence of the situation 
and it seems to us clear that the essence here was not an 
officer staging an interrogation that had focused on a subject 
but an officer reacting to a street scene and trying to run 
down the facts. There were two men before him, one reflect-
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ing signs of a possible assault, and he asked first one and 
then the other, what happened? We think that when the 
officer asked appellant if he had beaten Jeffries, he had not 
yet made a determination to arrest for assault but was rather 
engaged in sorting out the facts in a type of street investi-
gation. Miranda did not require the officer to preface with 
the several warnings therein outlined the questions put to 
this appellant. 
With all deference, by the time the officer asked defendant 
whether he had beaten Jeffries, defendant must have concluded-
certainly a reasonable man would have-that he was not free 
to go, that his liberty was significantly restrained. A person caught 
at 3:30 a.m. driving at an extremely slow speed with his head-
lights off [doesn't this eliminate the possibility that he was taking 
Jeffries to the hospital?] with a back-seat passenger whose face 
is battered "beyond recognition" is in a "bad spot." Defendant 
must have known this and must have realized that the officer knew 
it, too. Although Jeffries' gesture was not unambiguous, his 
raising his hand and pointing to defendant was hardly calculated 
to relieve any of "the pressure" defendant must have been feeling. 
Moreover, after failing to produce either a driver's permit 
or registration, and after failing to explain who owned the car, 
where it came from and where he had gotten it (it turned out 
defendant was driving a stolen car), defendant must have realized 
that the officer would not let him go without checking out the 
ownership of the car. (As Mathis, discussed supra at p. 337-8, a 
case handed down by the United States Supreme Court several 
months after the instant case was decided, makes plain, a person 
"in custody" in connection with one offense may not be ques-
tioned about an entirely separate offense without being given 
the Miranda warnings.) 
Although this writer believes that defendant Allen was being 
subjected to "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of 
Miranda he shares Judge Leventhal's view that it is a difficult 
case. Indeed, he feels obliged to point out that when he asked 
half a dozen of his colleagues how they would have decided the 
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case, all but one replied that asking the defendant whether he 
had beaten Jeffries was so "natural," "understandable" and 
"spontaneous" under the circumstances that the Miranda warning 
need not have been given.6 
United States v. Gibson is another close case, but one which 
probably falls beyond the pale of Miranda, as the court held. 
West Virginia state troopers began a hunt for a stolen car bearing 
Indiana license plates and found it outside a beer tavern. Entering 
the tavern and finding defendant seated at a table, one trooper 
asked defendant to step outside and engaged him in a brief 
conversation on the sidewalk about where he lived (Indiana) 
and whether he owned a car (defendant denied that he did). 
When the trooper next asked him, "Do you own this white car 
sitting here?'' defendant at first said he did not but almost 
6. Compare Schnepp v. State, 437 P.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Nev., 1968)-a case 
which this writer finds even more troublesome-where a TV set in the 
front seat, rather than a bloody passenger in the rear, proved defendant's 
undoing. Investigating the reported burglary of a television set from an 
unoccupied motel room, an officer stopped defendant's car, mo' mg slowly 
within a half block of the motel, and the only car on the street. The 
defendant came running back to the police car, but the officer worked 
his way up to defendant's car to get a better look and observed a television 
set partially covered with a sweater on the front seat. The officer then 
asked defendant two questions, to both of which he replied, "I don't 
know:" (1) to whom did the television set belong; and (2) how did it 
get into the car? Although the court views both questions as proper 
"pre-custody" "investigative" inquiries, it seems fairly clear that once 
defendant gave an incriminating "I don't know" to the first question, 
the second one should not have been asked without the Miranda warning. 
The more difficult and more fundamental issue, however, is whether the 
first question should have been asked without regard to Miranda. Argu-
ably, defendant, having unsuccessfully tried to keep the officer away from 
the car, may have reasonably concluded, once he realized the officer had 
spotted the TV set, that he was "caught red-handed" and thus signifi-
cantly deprived of his liberty. But how much did defendant know the 
officer knew? For example, did the officer just happen to be passing by 
or was he responding to a reported burglary? Looking at it from the 
suspect's point of view (the officer had certainly "focused" on Schnepp, 
but this writer has maintained at length that the "focus" test is no longer 
controlling), the Schnepp facts seem to merit the "sorting out the facts 
in a type of street investigation" characterization somewhat more than 
do the Allen facts. 
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immediately changed his tune: "Well, there's no use to lie to you. 
This is my car." 
Although, in ruling the statement admissible without the 
Miranda warnings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, per Sobeloff, J., suggests at one point that Miranda 
should be confined to situations akin to incommunicado, men-
acing station-house interrogation, 392 F .2d at 37 5-76 (for the 
view that this is an unduly restrictive reading see the discussion 
at p. 336-7 supra), and arguably, once the trooper pointed to the 
stolen car, defendant might have reasonably concluded that the 
trooper already knew too much about the case to let him go, 
the court's contrary conclusion does not seem unwarranted, id. 
at 376: 
[A]t the time of the conversation, [defendant] was not in 
custody or significantly restrained, or in any other way 
deprived of his free will. [The trooper] simply asked [him] 
to step to the sidewalk, and pointing to the car parked in 
front of the premises, asked him if it was his. At first denying 
ownership, [defendant] quickly reversed course and, without 
any pressure from the officer, voluntarily produced the docu-
ment intended to prove his ownership. It was at this point 
that [the trooper] noticed the alterations which led him to 
check further . . . 
... Significant in the instant case are the short duration of 
the questioning, which lasted no more than a few minutes; 
the very casual, reasonable and routine manner in which 
it was conducted; and the absence of any apparent purpose 
either to force or to trick the suspect into an admission of 
guilt. 
Just as a situation which begins by a defendant "volunteering" 
statements may quickly be transformed into one where the 
"volunteer" is being "interrogated," as when the officer "follows-
up" the initial statement with questions designed to enhance the 
person's guilt, such as by getting at the defendant's "state of 
mind" at the time he committed the act, see the discussion under 
"VouJ:-.oTEERED" STATEl\IENTS vs. STATEMENTS MADE IN REsPONSE 
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To "INTERROGATION," supra p. 380, so "general on-the-scene 
questioning" or "general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding 
process" may quickly be converted into "custodial interrogation," 
as when a "neutral inquiry" such as "What happened?" or "What's 
the trouble here?" draws an incriminating statement and the 
officer follows it up by pressing for details. Because they seem 
to overlook this point, the following cases, it is submitted, 
wrongly decided the "custodial interrogation" issue: 
State v. Taylor, 437 P.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. Ore., 1968) (defendant 
collided with another car within earshot of an officer who 
immediately drove to the scene; assuming arguendo that the 
first few questions were properly asked without the Miranda 
warning-whether it was defendant's car (yes) and whether he was 
driving it (yes)-it is questionable whether the officer should 
have then asked him whether he had been drinking (yes)-and 
after receiving an affirmative answer it seems fairly clear that 
the officer should not have pressed him further, as he did, without 
giving him the Miranda warnings, by asking him what he had 
been drinking (whiskey and beer), how much he had been 
drinking (four to five beers and a couple of whiskies), where 
he had been drinking, whether he was taking insulin, etc.; 
but the court regards all these questions as "general on-the-scene 
questioning"); 
State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E. 2d 638, 643, 645 
( 1968) (on receiving a call that a shooting had occurred at a 
certain address, police proceeded to investigate; finding, upon 
arrival, a man bleeding from a neck wound in defendant's yard, 
police asked defendant, in the presence of several people, what 
had happened; after defendant replied, "I shot him," the police 
then asked him why he had done so and also questioned him 
about the weapon he had used; court views entire situation as 
"a general investigation by police officers when called to the 
scene of a shooting" which is "a far cry from the 'in-custody 
interrogation' condemned in Miranda"); 
Tate v. State, 413 S.W. 2d 366, 369 (Sup. Ct. Tenn., 1967) (on 
arriving at defendant's place of business minutes after shooting 
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occurred, officers asked a group of people who had done the 
shooting and defendant replied that he had, whereupon the 
police asked him "why" and, in response, defendant furnished 
a motive; although Miranda not applicable because of early date 
of trial, court rules situation beyond scope of Escobedo and, 
by implication, Miranda, as well, by characterizing questioning 
at scene, including the "why" as "about as much of a general 
inquiry as one would ever find"). 
Although "follow-up" questions are natural and understand-
able in a rapid-fire situation, it is hard to believe that when 
the Supreme Court noted that "general on-the-scene questioning" 
or "general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process" 
was unaffected by Miranda that it meant to say that a person who 
has already admitted that he shot someone may be questioned 
further in the absence of the Miranda warnings.7 Nor is it easy 
to see how a person who responds to further questioning at this 
point may be viewed as merely engaging in "an act of responsible 
citizenship" by giving "whatever information [he J may have to 
aid in law enforcement," to quote from the sentence in the 
Miranda opinion immediately following-and apparently ilium-
7. Although prima facie an officer asking, "What's the trouble?" upon arriving 
at the scene of a reported crime would seem to be engaged in "general 
on-the-scene questioning," an earlier admission to the authorities may 
convert this prima facie "neutral inquiry" into "custodial interrogation." 
Consider State v. Billings, 436 P.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Nev., 1968): A police 
department radio dispatcher received a telephone request for police aid. 
When the dispatcher asked, "What's the trouble?" defendant replied, "I 
just killed my wife." In response to "Who's calling, please?" defendant 
then gave his right name. (These follow-up questions do not constitute 
"custodial interrogation" because a person telephoning the police is 
plainly not in custody.") On arriving at defendant's home, an officer 
asked, "What's the trouble, Russ?" whereupon defendant made further 
incriminating statements-which the court categorized as "volunteered" or, 
alternatively, in response to general on-the-scene questioning. But de-
fendant probably realized-surely a reasonable man would have-that since 
the dispatcher had passed on his request for police assistance the statement 
"I just killed my wife" must have been passed on, too, and that 
therefore the officer who proceeded to his home and asked him what 
the trouble was already knew that he had shot his wife. 
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inating-the language about "general on-the-scene questioning." 
(See p. 360-l supra). Once a member of a group at the scene 
steps forward to make a damaging admission, it seems he may 
reasonably conclude that he is no longer free to leave and that, 
in effect, he is "in custody." 
Lest the forcefulness of some of this writer's assertions and 
the irreverence of his criticism of some state and lower federal 
court cases may have deceived or misled the reader, he feels 
obliged to say-after pondering dozens of cases dealing with the 
possible application of Miranda to the squad car, the streets, the 
home and the office-that if Professor Graham exaggerated he 
did so only slightly when he remarked that "in the case of 
questioning away from the police station, where there is no arrest 
or detention, it is all but impossible to decide when Miranda-
Escobedo rights arise." What is "Custodial Interrogation?": 
California's AnticijJatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59, 89 (1966). 
A point made at the outset of this commentary bears repeating: 
As the Court must have been well aware, confining the l\1iranda 
rules to station-house proceedings-which would have sufficed to 
dispose of all the cases before it-would have put enormous 
pressure on the police to increase "field" and "squad car" 
questioning. By defining "custodial questioning" to include some 
situations where a person is not in the police station or even 
under "formal arrest," the Court was understandably reaching 
out to protect its flanks-but necessarily most tentatively) gingerly 
and uncertainly. Thus one can confidently say of the Court's 
definitions of "custodial interrogation" only that if ever judicial 
language was fraught with "creative ambiguity," if ever it 
had "potential for expansion" or for "shrinkage" this language 
does. This aspect of Miranda will be brought into sharp focus 
only by new prodding of new fact situations by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
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Title II of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968-Admissibility of Confessions and Eye Witness Testimony 
SEc. 701. (a) Chapter 223, title 18, United States Code (relating 
to witnesses and evidence), is amended by adding at the end 
thereof the following new sections: 
"§ 3501. Admissibility of confessions 
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or 
by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection 
(e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily 
given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial 
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue 
as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the con-
fession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence 
and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence 
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give 
such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under 
all the circumstances. 
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness 
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding 
the giving of the confession, including ( l) the time elapsing 
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the 
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, 
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with 
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time 
of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was 
advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement 
and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) 
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to ques-
tioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether 
or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel 
when questioned and when giving such confession. 
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"The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned 
factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be 
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. 
"(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the 
District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person 
who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest 
or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer 
or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because 
of delay in bringing such person before a commissioner or other 
officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against 
the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such 
confession is found by the trial judge to have been made 
voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left 
to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such 
person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other 
detention: Provided) That the time limitation contained in this 
subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in 
bringing such person before such commissioner or other officer 
beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be 
reasonable considering the means of transportation and the dis-
tance to be traveled to the nearest available such commissioner 
or other officer. 
"(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission 
in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any 
person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or 
at any time at which the person who made or gave such 
confession was not under arrest or other detention. 
"(e) As used in this section, the term 'confession' means any 
confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating 
statement made or given orally or in writing. 
"§ 3502. Admissibility in evidence of eye witness testimony 
"The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or 
participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused 
is being tried shall be admissble in evdence in a criminal 
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prosecution in any trial court ordained and established under 
article III of the Constitution of the United States." 
(b) The section analysis of that chapter is amended by adding 
at the end thereof the following new items: 
"3501. Admissibility of confessions. 
"3502. Admissibility of evidence of eye witness testmony." 
Although President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Act 
into law on June 19, 1968, he manifested a lack of enthusiasm 
about Title II, which purports to "repeal" in federal prosecutions 
Miranda and other recent Supreme Court cases: 
Title II of the legislation deals with certain rules of 
evidence only in Federal criminal trials-which account for 
only 7 per cent of the criminal felony prosecutions in this 
country. The provisions of Title II, vague and ambiguous 
as they are, can, I am advised by the Attorney General, be 
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution, and Federal 
practices in this field will continue to conform to the 
Constitution. 
Under long-standing policies, for example, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and other Federal law enforcement 
agencies have consistently given suspects full and fair warning, 
that of Constitutional rights. I have asked the Attorney 
General and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation to assure that these policies will continue. 
